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ARTICLES
ON “SECONDARY AESTHETICS, WITHOUT
ISOLATION”: PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MIKHAIL BAKHTIN’S THEORY OF FORM 
Dušan Radunović, Durham University (UK)
Ever since it resurfaced in the ﬁeld of literary studies in the early 1960s, the
work of Mikhail Bakhtin has inundated the broad array of global humanities
with a long list of innovative, albeit sometimes opaque, critical terms, of
which heteroglossia, chronotope, and outsidedness (vnenakhodimost') are but
a few. Concomitant to the assumption of the complete originality of these
cross-disciplinary concepts is that of Bakhtin as a solitary genius who lived
and worked in a socio-historical vacuum, that is, against, rather than within,
a real historical time and a real social environment.
1
Hand in hand with this
perception of the absolute uniqueness of Bakhtin as a historical ﬁgure, there
developed the myth of the radical originality of his intellectual output. It con-
tinued to dominate Bakhtin Studies even when, in the 1990s, the discipline
came of age as a ﬁeld of study residing in the interstices between modern
philology and the history of ideas. Bakhtin Studies thus continued to be pre-
occupied with what was considered to be the master’s completely original
concepts. This scholarly context informs the choice of topic explored in this
paper. Leaving behind the Romantic—and obsolete—notion of Bakhtin’s
uniqueness and instead introducing the idea of intellectual non-synchronicity,
this paper investigates Bakhtin’s engagement with one of the central concepts
of Western aesthetics: the concept of artistic form. 
Appearing for the ﬁrst and only time on Bakhtin’s agenda in 1924, in an
unpublished manuscript provisionally entitled “The Methodological Ques-
tions of Literary Aesthetics” (“K voprosam metodologii estetiki slovesnogo
SEEJ, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2015): p. 1–p. 22 1
1. For an extensive survey of the Russian reception of Bakhtin’s oeuvre since its resurfacing
in the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, see Emerson 31–72. A subtle and exceptionally well-argued
call for a scrutiny of socio-cultural constructions surrounding Bakhtin and his Circle is given in
Shepherd 1–21. 
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tvorchestva”),
2
the problem of form remained a hapax legomenon, a single
occurrence, in the Russian critic’s versatile oeuvre. Discursively, the article
surprises the reader of today with an incongruous merger of a contemporary
polemical edge and a rather obsolete theoretical idiom. Its impassioned dia-
tribe against “material aesthetics” (material'naia estetika), profoundly asyn-
chronous in its genealogy, was likely prompted, and shaped, by some inner
dynamics of the scientiﬁc ﬁeld of early Soviet literary scholarship.
3
One may
assume that Bakhtin’s decision to embark on discussing aesthetic form was
driven by his intention to penetrate from the periphery into the very center of
the ﬁeld of early Soviet literary studies. It was a ﬁeld that had been set and
dominated by two mutually competing “formalist” agendas: the one advanced
by the Russian Formalists, and the other, championed by Gustav Shpet
(1879–1937) and his circle at the State Academy for the Research in the Arts
(GAKhN). Unafﬁliated with either of these institutions and, very likely, with-
out any academic qualiﬁcations whatsoever at the time (Poole 124–5),
Bakhtin was attempting to carve out a niche for himself by writing on a sub-
ject that would not reappear in his later works. However that may be, the ac-
tual intellectual ediﬁce on which Bakhtin developed his theory of form is still
opaque. The present paper aims to redress this state of affairs; it endeavors to
elucidate the intellectual origins of Bakhtin’s discourse on form by recon-
structing the intellectual and socio-cultural contexts of its emergence. Indis-
putably, a very important intellectual source was Neo-Kantianism and the
next section treats that very issue. 
On Mind, Nature and Objects of Art: 
Neo-Kantian Aesthetics from Hermann Cohen to Broder Christiansen
Numerous Bakhtin studies have shown that the scholar’s earliest writings
on aesthetics and moral philosophy were decisively shaped by turn-of-the-
century German philosophy.
4
This heterogeneous intellectual corpus included
2. The article was commissioned by the journal Russian Contemporary (Russkii sovremen-
nik) and was written no later than June 1924. However, due to the fact that the journal ceased
to exist in autumn 1924, the paper remained unpublished until 1974, when, in a slightly abbre-
viated form, it appeared under the editorial title of “Toward the Aesthetics of Literature” (“K es-
tetike slova”).
3. We learn from the recently published correspondence between Bakhtin and his friend and
associate Matvei Isaevich Kagan (at the time fellow at the Philosophy Department in GAKhN)
that Bakhtin pleaded with Kagan to help him ﬁnd an afﬁliation with any of the Moscow-based
academic institutions (Kagan 636). 
4. Bakhtin’s afﬁliations with the German and continental philosophical legacies have been
discussed at length. The earliest attempt to systematize this abundance of references and per-
sonal testimonies came with the publication of Bakhtin’s intellectual biography by Katerina
Clark and Michael Holquist (1984, especially Chapters 2 and 3). Outside the English-speaking
world, the earliest attempts to assess Bakhtin’s intellectual debt to turn-of-the-century German
thought appear in the writings of Reiner Grübel (1989) and Natal'ia Bonetskaia (1985). In the
decade to come, investigations of Bakhtin’s philosophical origins became more frequent and
2 Slavic and East European Journal
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various schools of psychology-informed Einfühlungs aesthetics (aesthetics of
sympathy/empathy), as promoted by, for example, Theodor Lipps, Johannes
Volkelt, Wilhelm Wundt, and Hermann Lotze; by early phenomenology in its
Austrian and German variations represented by Franz Brentano, Anton Marty,
Edmund Husserl, and Max Scheler; and, most important of all, by German
neo-Kantianism in both of its incarnations: the South-Western School with its
chief proponents Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) and Heinrich Rickert
(1863–1936) and the Marburg School, dominated by the polyhistoric ﬁgure
of the German-Jewish thinker Hermann Cohen (1842–1918). Neo-Kantian-
ism on the whole, and Cohen’s work in particular, feature importantly in
Bakhtin’s formative years: textual references to neo-Kantian ideas in
Bakhtin’s key writings, as well as autobiographical accounts, all testify to the
decisive inﬂuence of neo-Kantianism on the young thinker (Kagan 636–7;
Bakhtin, Besedy 40, 241, passim).5 Bakhtin’s early ethical treatise, dated be-
tween 1918 and 1924 (Gogotishvili, “Teoreticheskaia” 352) and now known
as Toward a Philosophy of the Act (K ﬁlosoﬁi postupka), mentions Cohen
merely in parentheses (Bakhtin, SS 23). Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s most ambi-
tious contribution to aesthetics, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”
(“Avtor i geroi v esteticheskoi deiatel'nosti”) relies heavily on this philoso-
pher’s work (SS 94 passim).6 Nor was Bakhtin’s 1924 article “The Method-
ological Questions of Literary Aesthetics” an exception: it was precisely
Cohen’s philosophical system that helped Bakhtin to establish the conceptual
framework he needed for the redeﬁnition of the aesthetic process in this text,
and to launch what he thought of as a fundamental critique of material aes-
thetics from the standpoint of philosophical aesthetics. 
In his 1912 The Aesthetics of Pure Feeling (Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls)
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 3
thorough. The works of Ken Hirschkop (1990), Brian Poole (1995) and Galin Tihanov (1998),
among others, transformed the landscape of Bakhtin studies for good, introducing an era of
more systematic investigations of Bakhtin’s philosophical origins, most notably realized in the
works of Craig Brandist (2002), Brian Poole (2002), and Tihanov (2000).
5. As richly documented in Dmitrieva, neo-Kantianism found fertile soil in turn-of-the-cen-
tury Russia, where it was quickly assimilated by various intellectual circles and introduced in
university curricula. Bakhtin’s own exposure to neo-Kantian ideas was mediated through his
friend and associate Matvei Kagan. Kagan ﬁrst studied in Leipzig under Wundt and Volkelt,
then moved to Berlin to take private tutorials with Cohen, after which he returned to Marburg
where he received his doctorate under Paul Natorp (1854–1924) in 1914 (Dmitrieva 191; M.
Kagan 23). Kagan’s inﬂuence on Bakhtin was initially addressed in Clark and Holquist (see es-
pecially 57–62), and it received a more substantial elucidation in Poole (“Nazad”; “Rol'”),
Iudif´ Kagan, Coates, and more recently Makhlin. 
6. A number of unreferenced formulations and the critical intention of the treatise overall
suggest that the lost parts of Toward a Philosophy of the Act may have contained even more sub-
stantial discussions of Cohen’s philosophy (Gogotishvili, “Teoreticheskaia” and ”Postranich-
nye”). Bakhtin’s utilization of Cohen’s ideas in Author and Hero has been discussed in Makhlin,
“2nd Introduction” 597–600. On the assimilation of Cohen’s aesthetics in Author and Hero see
also Steinby 232–242. 
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Hermann Cohen embarked on a rather ambitious philosophical enterprise: to
“improve” Kant’s account of the faculties of reason, morality and taste by
eradicating/conciliating any gulf that might exist between them, as well as to
assert that non-aesthetic acts (e.g., cognition, evaluation) are in fact inherent to
aesthetic activity. The work of art, the philosopher states, “must be an object
of nature” (ein Gegenstand der Natur); moreover, he further asserts, the work
of art is “an object of the knowledge of nature” (ein Gegenstand der Natur-
erkenntnis) (Cohen, System 80). Therefore, the work of art is not independent
of the laws of morality and cognition but must be able to “sire a pure object of
moral cognition” (“Und das Kunstwerk muß ferner [...] ein Gegenstand der
Sittlichkeit sein, und als ein reiner Gegenstand der sittlichen Erkenntnis
erzeugbar werden”) (Cohen, System 80).7 As a result of Cohen’s transforma-
tion of Kant’s theory of three separate faculties into an inclusive theory of
“three conditions,” there emerge the core postulates of his philosophy of art:
that aesthetics may have an impact on cognitive philosophy and ethics, not just
vice versa (Akindinova, “Estetika G. Kogena” 507); that art does not exist in
itself, without other human potentials; and, ﬁnally, that art scholarship, no mat-
ter how comprehensive, cannot account for the phenomenon of art, nor can it
ﬁgure as a “unitary foundation of art” (Poma, Critical 132).8
Cohen’s renegotiation of the Kantian boundary between aesthetic and
non-aesthetic realms canvases with clarity an aspect of Bakhtin’s late phi-
losophy that vitally informed his articulation of the content–form di-
chotomy: the moral and cognitive spheres are seen here as experiential and
methodological prerequisites for aesthetic experience. This reconstellation
of the artistic realm vis-à-vis ethics and cognition enabled Bakhtin to con-
clude, in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” that aesthetic activity is
a “secondary creation,” which “does not create an entirely new reality,” but
nonetheless “stands on an equal footing with the realms of ethics and knowl-
edge” (SS 287).9 This skillful appropriation of Cohen’s general insights also
draws our attention to another aspect of the philosopher’s aesthetics that
7. All translations from German and Russian in this article are mine, unless otherwise
 indicated.
8. It is essential for our further discussion of Bakhtin’s theory of form to restate our position
that Cohen here (and, by the same token, Bakhtin) departs from Kant’s theory of faculties. The
imputation of Kant’s theory of faculties to Bakhtin occurs as a common error in a number of re-
cent accounts of Bakhtin’s early work. See for example Michael Holquist’s attempt to reduce
Bakhtin’s view of human faculties to Kant’s original teaching (Holquist 6), which has already
been competently discussed and refuted (Steinby 236) and, especially, Nikolai Nikolaev’s com-
mentaries to Volume 1 of Bakhtin’s Collected Works, where Cohen’s inﬂuence on “The Method-
ological Questions of Literary Aesthetics” was also misread (Bakhtin, SS 722–3). 
9. In the margins of the manuscript of “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” Bakhtin made
a note which reads as follows: “[S]econdary aesthetics, without isolation” (“vtorichnaia es-
tetika, bez izoliatsii”) (SS 110). The note clearly suggests that the aesthetic realm is secondary
to cognition and the moral act, but is neither detached from, nor subordinate to them. 
4 Slavic and East European Journal
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more specifically influenced Bakhtin’s thought on form: the notion that the
understanding of the arts requires a new “disposition of consciousness,” one
which could encompass this more comprehensive vision of the artistic
realm. In a characteristic neo-Idealist move, Cohen finds this new “disposi-
tion” in the concept/experience of feeling (Gefühl), a faculty that, he be-
lieved, was capable of being directed both “toward the outside” (that is, ex-
terior content), and inward (Akindinova, “Die systematische” 71–2 and
“Analitika” 6–7). Like the Romantic poet Friedrich Schiller before him,
Cohen asserts that it is through the faculty of pure feeling that aesthetic
 activity establishes a new unity of man and nature, of law and freedom. The
aesthetic feeling, he writes, is “love [...] for human nature” (Liebe ... zur
Natur des Menschen) (199). Cohen terms this interplay of human faculties
and the natural world Gestaltung, or form-bestowing. It follows from the
foregoing that the act of form-bestowing cannot be reduced merely to the
external existence of the object: the two-sided nature of aesthetic Gestalt
comprises both the external form and interior meaning in a unity, which
Cohen compares to that of body and soul (Cohen 191; Akindinova, “Anali-
tika” 12 and “Die systematische” 76).
This articulation of form as a Gestalt that resides at the boundary between
the realms of the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic will leave a strong imprint
on Bakhtin’s contemplation of artistic form. Although less ambitiously than
Cohen with regard to the reconciliatory function of aesthetics, in “The
Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics” Bakhtin similarly con-
ceives of artistic creation as an inherently receptive activity. Reality, that is,
the object of aesthetic activity, Bakhtin writes, “predates the aesthetic act,” in-
sofar as it is “cognized and evaluated by the [moral and cognitive] act” (SS
286).
10
Artistic activity is deﬁned here as an a posteriori practice in its rela-
tion to the realms of cognition and ethics, which is, nonetheless, intrinsically
and inescapably linked to them. It is at this point that Bakhtin’s discussion of
the aesthetic realm is subject to yet another neo-Kantian mediation: the
thought of the German aesthetician Broder Christiansen (1869–1958). Almost
forgotten today, Christiansen’s work, initially his 1902 Theory of Knowledge
(Erkenntnisstheorie und Philosophie des Erkennens),11 and especially his
magnum opus, the 1909 Philosophy of Art (Philosophie der Kunst) exerted an
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 5
10. In Russian: “prednakhodimaia esteticheskim aktom [...] deistvitel'nost'.” The English
translation of the text omits the important part of Bakhtin’s articulation of the aesthetic as a
practice a posteriori (SS 278). 
11. Originally published in Hanau in 1902, Christiansen’s Theory of Knowledge appeared in
Russian as Psikhologiia i teoriia poznaniia (Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge) in 1907.
The volume, which was translated by Evgenii Borichevskii (1883–1934), was edited and pref-
aced by Boris Aleksandrovich Fokht (1875–1946), one of the leading ﬁgures of early Russian
neo-Kantianism. Having studied in Heidelberg under Kuno Fischer (1824–1907), and in
Freiburg under Rickert (Dmitrieva 151–2), Fokht moved to Marburg, most likely in 1904,
where he studied under Cohen and Natorp (Dmitrieva 171–2).
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immense inﬂuence on virtually every orientation in Russian liberal humani-
ties in the 1910s. Fedor Stepun’s (1884–1965)
12
rapid review of The Philos-
ophy of Art in the international journal Logos, which regarded the volume as
a work of “utmost interest” (Stepun 278–280), prompted the Russian transla-
tion of Christiansen’s work. Carried out by the philosopher Georgii Fedotov
(1886–1951), the Russian translation of The Philosophy of Art appeared in
1911 and was enthusiastically greeted both by the cultural elite of the late Im-
perial era and by the new “generation of the 1890s.”
13
It was the daring eclecticism of The Philosophy of Art, a feature noted al-
ready in Stepun’s review, that triggered the proliﬁc reception of Chris-
tiansen’s aesthetic theory in Russia. Following the Baden neo-Kantians and,
in particular, his philosophical mentor Heinrich Rickert,
14
in the attempt to
reestablish the methodology of the humanities on the principle of value, yet
also relying ﬁrmly on the phenomenological principle of intentionality, Chris-
tiansen conceived of aesthetic activity as inseparable from the subject’s act of
evaluation. While Bakhtin never acknowledged his familiarity with Chris-
tiansen’s work (a subject to which I will return later), it is important to note
that this same blend of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology decisively
shaped his own early ethics and aesthetics (Brandist, “Two Routes” 526 pas-
sim; Nikiforov 227 passim).
The notion that philosophical thinking is an axiological act gave rise to an-
other key proposition of Christiansen’s aesthetics, which is of normative im-
port for Bakhtin’s theory of form: according to Christiansen, the aesthetic ob-
12. Having studied in Heidelberg under the key ﬁgures of South-Western German neo-Kan-
tianism, Wilhelm Windelband and Emil Lask, Stepun returned to Russia in 1907 where he,
among other things, set up the Russian-language version of the international journal Logos
(1910–1914) (see Dmitrieva 211). In September 1922 Stepun was expelled from the Soviet
Union, along with other prominent Russian intellectuals (Fitzpatrick 76). 
13. The release of Filosoﬁia iskusstva (The Philosophy of Art) in 1911 (St. Petersburg: Ship -
ovnik) appealed to a rather heterogeneous array of thinkers, ranging from the champions of the
Silver Age to the Russian Formalists. While Christiansen’s inﬂuence on the Formalists and their
intellectual orbit (from Boris Eikhenbaum and Sergei Bernshtein to their colleague and oppo-
nent Boris Engelgardt, or the founder of the Prague Linguistic Circle Jan Mukařovský) has re-
ceived some scholarly attention (Erlich 199–200; Gerigk 86–8; Grübel, “Der Russische” 2237;
Khanzen-Lёve [Hansen-Löve], Russkii formalizm 305–306; Steiner 92–93), the dissemination
of his ideas among the Silver Age thinkers and artists has remained under-discussed. It might
be instructive to mention that Andrei Bely’s inﬂuential 1910 volume Symbolism (Simvolizm) al-
ready contains references to Christiansen’s masterpiece. In his 1916 The Meaning of the Cre-
ative Act (Smysl tvorchestva) Nikolai Berdiaev singled out the German thinker from the cohort
of modern aestheticians only to reduce, somewhat naively, Christiansen’s aesthetics to a speciﬁc
tool for self-discovery (“[...] art unmistakably reveals our own being,” 571). On the other hand,
Berdiaev was unquestionably right in praising Christiansen’s aesthetics for its rejection of both
dominant trends in European aesthetics of its time: empiricism and sensualism (Berdiaev 571). 
14. Christiansen earned a doctorate in philosophy in 1902 at Freiburg University under Rick-
ert’s supervision, with a thesis on Descartes’ theory of judgment (Gerigk 89).
6 Slavic and East European Journal
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ject, the central concept of aesthetic analysis, is a conceptual, rather than real
(empirical), entity constructed in mental perception. To mitigate the abstract
bias of this conception of the aesthetic object, Christiansen introduces the
idea that aesthetic perception presents an intentional act; by this move he im-
parts concreteness to each aesthetic object and also deﬁnes the aesthetic ob-
ject as a teleological entity.
15
The ﬁrst thing that strikes one about Chris-
tiansen’s conception is the denunciation of any equivalence between aesthetic
object and the empirical/material aspects of a work of art, by which Chris-
tiansen took a critical stance toward the so-called “aesthetics of pure visibil-
ity” and the sensualist-formalist tendency in turn-of-the-century German art
scholarship.
16
Crucially, the empirical object of art, which is deﬁned by the
very elements it consists of, by the spatiotemporal nexus it assumes, and, ﬁ-
nally, by the interplay of thing (Ding) and causality (Kausalität), is denied
any aesthetic relevance whatsoever (Christiansen 53–4; Akindinova, “Es-
tetika” 136). Another consequence of the idea that the aesthetic object is a
mental representation of the object, rather than the object itself, is the notion
that the form/structure of the aesthetic object will ﬁrst and foremost be deter-
mined in relation to the structure that is established in the subject’s mind. This
aesthetic aggregate, or structure reconstituted/synthesized in the mind, legit-
imizes itself qua aesthetic value, each time one of its constitutive parts takes
over other elements and reorganizes them into a hierarchical, axiological for-
mation.
17
Christiansen terms this part the artistic dominant, by which he un-
derstands “any formal or objective element [of a work of art]” that “comes to
the fore and takes the leading role,” that is, gives a decisive shape to the aes-
thetic object (Christiansen 242).
18
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15. Advanced by the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917) and his school, the
conception of intentionality assumed that mental activity was correlative to the world and also
contained the assumption of the purposefulness of human deeds. For an excellent discussion of
the impact of the theory of intentionality on the transformation of turn-of-the-century neo-Kan-
tianism (and, by the same token, on Bakhtin’s own intellectual formation), see Brandist, “Two
Routes” 521 passim.
16. Proposed by, among others, the German aesthetician Konrad Fiedler in his 1876 study
On Judging Works of Visual Arts (Über die Beurteilung von Werken der bildenden Kunst), the
concept of “pure visibility” (der reinen Sichtbarkeit) suggests that the visible appearance of a
work of art is by no means a contingent matter, but rather, the ﬁnal, externalized completion of
a purposeful “Gestalt forming activity” (Fiedler 56 passim). 
17. The concept of aesthetic object was investigated by some of Brentano’s associates and
followers, most notably by Stephan Witasek (1870–1915), the philosopher of the Graz school
of experimental psychology and a follower of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) and Alexius
Meinong (1853–1920), for whom the aesthetic object was anything that incites “Ersatz [com-
pensatory] emotions” in the subject (Smith 204, emphasis added).
18. Christiansen’s conceptualization of an artistic dominant directly inﬂuenced the Russian
Formalist concept of dominant, which ﬁrst appeared in print in Boris Eikhenbaum’s 1922
Melodic Aspects of Russian Lyrical Poetry (Melodika russkogo liricheskogo stikha). Eikhen-
baum uses the idea of dominant to differentiate between the organizing principles of versiﬁcation 
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The way in which Christiansen facilitated the transition from a subjective
aesthetic vision toward a more synthetic model is important. In order to en-
sure that one of the central concepts of his aesthetics does not remain bound
to individual aesthetic experience, Christiansen draws again on the apparatus
of Gestalt theory to hypothesize that the aesthetic object comes into being
through a process in which the initial sensory impressions are ﬁrst trans-
formed into “feelings-based impressions” (Stimmungsimpressionen) and then
subjected to an additional, teleological activity of the mind.
19
The sheer ma-
teriality of art-work is initially “animated” in the act of sensory perception
(sinnliche Anschauung), the outcomes of which can be divided into three
major classes. The ﬁrst group of sensory data (e.g., the sculptor’s perception
of bronze or marble) that bear only initial relevance for the constitution of the
aesthetic object, is termed by Christiansen the material. Although it carries
what Christiansen calls the “idea-form,” and subsequently enters the percep-
tive synthesis, which yields the aesthetic object, the material does not have
any autonomous value in the process of the emergence of the aesthetic object
(Christiansen 57–60). The second group of perceptive data comprises what
Christiansen names the “objective/representational content” (der gegen-
ständliche/dargestellte Inhalt), which should be understood as the material
that is mediated through, and modiﬁed by, the subject’s perceptive act
(61–72). The third, and in Christiansen’s view, essential constitutive factor of
aesthetic object is the form: “[w]hile there can be a work of art without em-
pirical objects [Gegenständliches], there is no art without form,” he argues
(71). The supremacy of form does not relegate the other two constituents to a
lower level: in the ﬁnal stage of this process, which is termed the “synthesis
of the aesthetic object” (Objektsynthese) (41), form is inseparable from con-
tent. Although categorically distinct, in Christiansen—and, as we shall see, in
Bakhtin, too—content and form contribute to the constitution of the aesthetic
object in a dynamic unity and can be separated only in abstraction. A mental,
rather than a physically palpable category, artistic form hence emerges as the
crowning act of the synthesis of aesthetic object, a conceptual unity of ap-
pearance and sense that is attainable (only) in the act of perception. 
Wary of the empiricism of late-nineteenth-century aesthetics, and even
more concerned with what he calls “the sensualist dogma” in contemporary
aesthetics—a belief that sensory perception is not only the pre-condition of
and explain how one of various “formative elements” of the verse subjugates all others (“pod-
chiniaia ikh sebe”) (121). On the transfer of the term dominant from Christiansen to Eikhenbaum
and Russian Formalism in general see Hansen-Löve, “Dominanta” 15 passim and Russkii for-
malizm 305–7; also Gerigk 87–88, 94–95.
19. Christiansen’s idea of a dually structured aesthetic perception indeed resembles the dif-
ferentiation between the “simple object of sensation” (tones, colors, etc.) and more complex
Gestalt structures [...], which was introduced by Witasek (Smith 203–232). 
8 Slavic and East European Journal
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aesthetic perception, but also its vital constituent—Christiansen in The Phi-
losophy of Art repeatedly highlights the danger of reducing the process of aes-
thetic intuition to merely a matter of the senses; he sees this move as equal to
confusing the whole of the aesthetic process with the senses of hearing or see-
ing. Instead, he proffers that the ﬁnal purpose of aesthetic representation re-
sides not in producing/inciting a “sensual image of the object” (das sinnliche
Objektbild), but in bringing about a “non-pictorial impression of the object”
(unbildliche Gegenstandsimpression) (100). Yet, it would be wrong to assume
that the German philosopher denied aesthetic signiﬁcance to all sensory per-
ception. Christiansen puts on a pedestal what he calls “differential sensations”
(Differenzempﬁndungen), which he understands as a disposition capable of
communicating the “differential/distinctive qualities” (Differenzqualitäten) to
our perception (118 passim).20 It is in this process of mediation between ma-
terial world and artistic form, which Christiansen terms the “object synthe-
sis,” that the aesthetic object emerges. Christiansen describes at length the
way in which the three key components of the aesthetic object, material, con-
tent and form, interact as a “successive fusion” (sukzessive Verschmelzung)
and also as a process of “growing into” (Ineinander-Wachsen). These mental
acts, which lead to the appropriation of initial sensations, are fundamental for
aesthetic perception and they are in operation in every aesthetic experience,
Christian asseverates (Khristiansen 127). 
Christiansen’s sophisticated, if eclectic, diversiﬁcation of the process of ob-
ject synthesis, and his distancing from both nineteenth-century formalist art
scholarship and classical idealist aesthetics, served as the key points of depar-
ture for the young Bakhtin. At present we have no documentary evidence
whether or not Bakhtin read Christiansen’s work; he was a notoriously reluc-
tant user of references in his own early writings, and the name of the German
aesthetician does not emerge in any of Bakhtin’s personal testimonies that we
have available. Yet it is highly unlikely, given the popularity of Christiansen’s
thought in Russia in the 1910s, the intrinsic importance of his theories to all
the intellectual strands and ﬁgures surrounding Bakhtin at the time, and the
young Bakhtin’s habit of devouring philosophical literature coming from the
German-speaking world, that he would not be cognizant of the German
thinker’s work. As the following pages will explore, Christiansen’s delin-
eations lurk beneath Bakhtin’s 1924 investigation into artistic form in more
ways than one: the German thinker’s daring reconceptualizations enabled
Bakhtin to make a similar heuristic move in his own reassessment of the aes-
thetics of form, where neo-Kantian transcendentalism and phenomenological
realism likewise served as two fundamental vectors.
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 9
20. A fair, although cursory, treatment of the role that Christiansen’s concept of differential
sensations played in the emergence of the Russian Formalist conception of estrangement is
given in Steiner 92–93 and Khanzen-Lëve [Hansen-Löve], Russkii formalizm 305–306. 
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Toward Immanent Overcoming: Bakhtin’s Axiological Theory of Form 
The neo-Kantian distinction between fact and value,
21
along with the ensu-
ing notion that the object of knowledge in the humanities is never a factual
given but a task to be achieved by the subject, coalesces in Bakhtin’s early
work with a slightly modiﬁed theory of intentionality. This framework en-
abled him to avoid the tag of “speculative idealism” (an intellectual label that
would be increasingly inopportune in the climate of the 1920s), which his
overreliance on neo-Kantianism could have generated. Bakhtin’s earliest ar-
ticulation of this conceptual blend appears in his ethical treatise Toward a
Philosophy of the Act, a text which aspires to think through and theorize an
ethical subject capable of transcending the limitations of two of the reigning
conceptions of modern ethics—the universally legitimate formal ethics, and
the content-driven material ethics.
22
To assist with this ambitious project, the young thinker solicited the aid of
turn-of-the-century German value theory, in particular that of the renegade
neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, and Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) ques-
tioning of the absolute validity of truth.
23
The introduction of the instances
21. In Rickert’s interpretation, for example, the distinction between facts and values assumes
that experienced reality is split into two autonomous, yet related realms, the empirical realm of
“real” objects and facts, and the non-empirical realm of values. While the former “can be ex-
plained (erklären), values and valuable objects must be understood (verstehen)” (Zijderveld
146). Nowadays this distinction is mainly considered obsolete (see, for example, Putnam).
22. The critique of formal ethics and attempts to foster an alternative, subject-oriented ethi-
cal conception was a preeminent concern of the Munich-based neo-Kantian-turned-phenome-
nologist Max Scheler (1874–1928). The inﬂuence of Scheler’s work on sympathy on the emer-
gence of Bakhtin’s conception of the author-hero relationship has been documented (Poole
“From Phenomenology”) and further evaluated (most extensively in Brandist, Bakhtin passim).
Yet to be fully addressed is the impact of Scheler’s earlier work, the 1916 Formalism in Ethics
and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik),
on Bakhtin’s contemplations concerning ethics.
23. Although Bakhtin’s relation to Husserl has been addressed (see, for example, Gogo-
tishvili, “Teoreticheskaia” 385–402; Averintsev 438–456; Brandist, Bakhtin 58 passim), the lat-
ter’s inﬂuence on the young Bakhtin still remains an open chapter in the Russian thinker’s intel-
lectual biography. While Husserl receives a mention in Bakhtin’s early works mainly as a
contrasting background (SS 10, 131), it is plausible that his early idea, namely that the logically
based truth of a judgment does not implicate the obligatory character of that judgment (Logical
Investigations, Vol. 2, Investigation 5, especially paragraphs 37–42), did inﬂuence Bakhtin’s no-
tion that the obligatory character of the human act cannot be guaranteed by the moral/ethical ap-
propriateness of that act (Bakhtin, Toward 5 and SS 10, 462 n. 6*). Certainly, the answer that
Bakhtin gives to the problem of the universality of a truth-statement radically differs from that
of Husserl insofar as the Russian thinker drew on the individual act of the ethical subject,
whereas Husserl rejected contingencies on the path to knowledge (the so-called eidetic reduc-
tion). Somewhat ironically, in the light of Husserl’s later theory of Lebenswelt (literally, life-
world), published in 1936 in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine
Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie), and generally understood as a historically 
10 Slavic and East European Journal
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of validity (znachimost´), value (tsennost´) and judgment (suzhdenie) in
Bakhtin’s conception of the ethical act/deed brought about an overhaul in the
neo-Kantian framework of Bakhtin’s early thought. With these new philo-
sophical additions Bakhtin imbued the neo-Kantian categories with a subjec-
tive, real-historical charge, thereby turning them into potentially attainable
categories. This conceptual reconstellation had a pragmatic and immediate
aim: by espousing a radically different concept of human experience, Bakhtin
secured for himself conceptual leverage with which he was able to challenge
the fundamentals of the Russian Formalist understanding of form, whilst si-
multaneously matching their emphasis on the real and the concrete.
Understandably, Bakhtin focalizes his early use of this hybrid philosophi-
cal framework around those aesthetic categories that establish the interface
between a work of art and the outside world: material, content and form. The
contours of Bakhtin’s reassessment of these concepts were drawn in his early-
to-mid-1920s treatise “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” In a detailed
scrutiny of the axiological dynamic between authorial perception (videnie av-
tora, Anschauung)24 and the object of perception (geroi), Bakhtin rejected the
idea that the material, or, the transcription of the objective world, may have
any aesthetic relevance. Aesthetic activity begins with the transformation, and
eventuates in the completion, of the material of perception (SS 107). During
aesthetic activity, the material, or rather, the author’s supposedly unmediated
record of objective reality is being infused “with moments that are transgre-
dient to the objective world [...]” (Bakhtin, SS 107, my emphasis).25 Bakhtin’s
use of eminently neo-Kantian terminology emphasizes here that, in order for
an aesthetic act to take place, the transformation of primary aesthetic percep-
tion must be performed by another, axiologically external instance. Aesthetic
activity itself then presents a “secondary creation.”
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 11
deﬁned and culturally constructed framework within which the subject’s experience of the world
takes place (Łukasiewicz 27), Bakhtin’s theory of truth-judgment in Toward a Philosophy of the
Act could be understood as a surprisingly synchronous anticipation of Husserl’s revisionism.
24. The semantic potential of Anschauung, the term that enters the modern history of ideas
with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, is proliﬁc and diverse (Naumann-Beyer 212). Deﬁned by
Kant in the First Critique as the “immediate representation of the object” (“unmittelbare Vor -
stellung des Gegenstandes”) Anschauung referred to the cognitive disposition of the human sub-
ject. Some twenty years later, in Kant’s Third Critique, Anschauung is used to denote the indi-
vidual perception of the aesthetic object. In turn-of-the-century Kunstwissenschaft the term
primarily refers to a disposition in the human subject that is beyond either cognitive knowledge
or sensual perception, becoming therewith a mental activity that draws on perceptive and reﬂec-
tive human abilities, but is irreducible to either sensation or reﬂection alone. 
25. The concept of transgredience originated in the neo-Kantian intellectual milieu. In the
work of Wilhelm Windelband and, more importantly perhaps, that of his student, the inﬂuential
aesthetician Jonas Cohn, this term relates to Kant’s transcendentalist doctrine and denotes the
speciﬁcally aesthetic quality of being transcendental to the boundaries of one’s own conscious-
ness (Cohn 27 n. 1, passim).
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This marriage between aesthetics and value theory in “Author and Hero in
Aesthetic Activity” presents the intellectual context for Bakhtin’s interven-
tion in the ongoing Soviet debates on literary and artistic form, as articulated
in his 1924 article “The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics.”
The main premise of this article is that the artist does not have immediate ac-
cess to the objective world, but operates within a world that is pre-ordered by
ethical judgment and cognition. The artist’s utilization of “nature,” or mate-
rial, can therefore be understood as an “immanent overcoming” (immanent-
noe preodolenie) of what has already been created, articulated, or used. In
practice, the aesthetic activity of which Bakhtin writes in “The Methodolog-
ical Questions of Literary Aesthetics” assumes that the poet is not the Bibli-
cal Adam, who experiences the world intact and for the ﬁrst time, but rather,
the subject who is deeply immersed in the world of articulate objects in which
he leaves his own form-bestowing imprint. The poet’s entry into language is
not a passive sub-scription to the language understood as an elemental force,
but an active in-scription into the language as an ever-changing medium. This
active overcoming of language stands in contrast with what Bakhtin termed
the “negative overcoming” of language, the example of which he ﬁnds in the
Russian Formalist conception of estrangement, where the dynamic, multifac-
eted repository of human experience was relegated to its mere surface, to pho-
netic or stylistic manifestations. The active overcoming of language which,
Bakhtin advocates, implies that the author engages not with words in their
grammatical or encyclopedic sense, but with the values of the experienced
world, which those words represent for him/her. On this theoretical platform,
Bakhtin contends that the artist is governed by his/her wish to leave his eval-
uative imprint on the pre-existing world of ideas, values, social discourses
(which do include, but cannot be reduced to, artistic genres, styles, devices,
etc.) and that this engagement is his/her “primordial struggle [ pervichnaia
bor´ba] against the cognitive-cum-ethical orientation of life” (SS 229).26
By arguing that artistic creation and the form-bestowing act as its crown-
ing achievement are manifestations of the author’s axiological stance,
Bakhtin expands on Rickert’s idea that, just like the theoretical truth of phi-
losophy, aesthetic beauty belongs to a non-empirical reality, which can be ar-
ticulated by value-judgments (Zijderveld 146 passim). In another borrowing
from Rickert,
27
Bakhtin ﬁrmly holds his stance against the particularization
and diffusion of the humanities into individual disciplines, a process that was
26. It was likely with this in mind that the late Russian linguist Mikhail Gasparov declared
that Bakhtin’s entire early aesthetics could be understood as an attempt to “overcome the word”
(preodolenie slova) (495). 
27. On Rickert’s demarcation between cultural science (Kulturwissenschaft) and natural sci-
ence (Naturwissenschaft), and on his insistence that the former should have a unitary method-
ology, see Zijderveld 226–235.
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well underway within turn-of-the-century art scholarship in Europe, and
which was, he was convinced, taken to extremes in the practice of Russian
Formalism. Their positivistic stimulus, which suited natural sciences rather
than literary studies, as well as their focus on bare material, suggested to him
a gross misconception about what the subject matter of literary studies
should be. In Bakhtin’s view, all other critical frailties of Russian Formal-
ism—foremost among them the inability to establish an aesthetically valid
conception of form—originate from that fundamental error (SS 270–275). In
Bakhtin’s neo-Kantian vision, aesthetic form is the product of the author’s
evaluative encounter with the world and cannot be articulated immanently,
through object-relation. What this also means is that, although form is effec-
tuated by a human act, it does not have a material/objective existence; form
is a condition for a work of art to be brought into existence, insofar as the
form asserts the axiological, rather than ontological, status of a work of art.
The fact that in a concrete aesthetic practice this execution of the author’s
axiological position takes a concrete, spatiotemporal and material shape is of
little import: unlike the Formalists, the young Bakhtin was more interested
in the philosophical premises of the aesthetic process than in the pragmatic
effects that this process has on the recipient (SS 273). In all fairness,
Bakhtin’s reaccentuation of cause and effect in the aesthetic relationship is
accompanied by an indisputable simpliﬁcation of the Russian Formalist po-
sitions. For instance, his core accusation that the Formalists failed to distin-
guish between raw material and form either disregards, or renders rather in-
adequately, one of the most important formalist documents of the same
period, Iurii Tynianov’s article “The Literary Fact” (“Literaturnyi fakt”),
published in July 1924. In this text, which signals the beginning of the sec-
ond, methodologically more sophisticated phase of Russian Formalism, Ty-
nianov makes a clear distinction between the two concepts, thereby distanc-
ing his own theoretical pursuit from the position of the group of critics
associated with the Left Front of Art (Osip Brik, Sergei Tretyakov, Nikolai
Chuzhak). For Tynianov, Brik’s calling for an entirely new reckoning of the
relationship between literature and everyday life (byt) was unacceptable as it
compromised the key Formalist concept of estrangement (ostranenie),
which rested upon the premise that art and (everyday) life are mutually ex-
clusive, and that the former is preconditioned by the transformation of the
latter (“Literaturnyi” 261). 
As a result of his theoretical reassessment, Bakhtin rejects the object-
 related idea of aesthetic process as inadequate to render the complexity of the
aesthetic relation and to produce a valid conception of artistic form. By em-
bracing the more appropriate (from the point of view of his revised neo-
 Kantianism) concept of aesthetic object, Bakhtin attempts to break through
the dead-end of the content-material-form relation. Following Christiansen,
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 13
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although, astonishingly, still failing to acknowledge this crucial debt,
28
in
“The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics” Bakhtin puts forward
the category of aesthetic object, which is constituted in the author’s act of re-
evaluation and is, therefore, fundamentally different from an empirical work
of art. The study of the aesthetic object understood as a relation of the human
mind is declared by Bakhtin to be “the main task of aesthetics” (SS 325 pas-
sim). Instead of following this precept, Bakhtin laments, the dominant
schools of poetics at the time preferred to concentrate on other aspects of a
work of art, namely its extra-aesthetic reality (dannost´ ) and the teleological
composition (tselevaia kompozitsiia) of material (SS 276). As a result, the
technically understood composition assumes the place of the aesthetic object.
In order to rectify this deviation from the “right” hermeneutic path, Bakhtin
introduces another differentiation within the aesthetic of composition—that
between architectonic and compositional forms. Architectonic forms, which
include qualitative categories such as the tragic, the comic, and the elegiac,
express the author’s interaction with the values of the social and historical
world, for which reason, they are axiological forms and enter the aesthetic
object (Bakhtin, SS 278). In contrast, compositional forms, for example, son-
net or novella, organize material in a rather technical sense and do not enter
the aesthetic object. To further elucidate this distinction we should revisit the
core idea of Bakhtin’s “The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthet-
ics,” that the criterion of aesthetic validity can never be merely technical and
that only those forms that embody the author’s reassessment of the world of
experience are aesthetically valid. An example that illustrates well the differ-
ence between the two modes of formal organization in the arts is rhythm,
which, according to Bakhtin, may be understood in both senses: when it em-
bodies feelings, attitudes or emotional evaluations, rhythm is an architectonic
form; insofar as it helps organize the material, it is a compositional one.
Bakhtin’s example hides another unacknowledged contemporaneous refer-
ence to Iurii Tynianov’s text, “Rhythm as the Constructive Factor of Verse,”
where rhythm is viewed as the constructive principle of poetry only when it
is “displaced,” i.e., when it deviates from a historically and culturally estab-
lished set of norms (Tynyanov, ”Rhythm” 132, 135 n13).
29
For Bakhtin, then, in order for the material, understood as intact nature, to
become the object of the artist’s attention, a primary articulation, or a conver-
sion of material into content, must be performed by the joint forces of ethical
28. In his opening remarks to “The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics,”
Bakhtin laconically liberates his study from the “ballast of quotations and references,” deeming
them “unnecessary to the competent reader, and of no use to the incompetent one” (SS 265).
29. Bakhtin’s familiarity with Tynianov’s article on rhythm is more than likely given that the
volume in which the essay appeared, The Problem of Verse Language (Problema stikhotvornogo
iazyka), was published in the spring of 1924, precisely at the time when Bakhtin began his work
on “The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics.” 
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evaluation and cognition. The artist, Bakhtin assumes in faithfully neo-Kantian
fashion, cannot see a world which has not been previously ordered for him by
mind and ethics. On the other hand, the worlds of art and experience do not re-
main impermeable to one another: the former is predicated upon the latter, in-
sofar as primary experience (the cognized and ethically mapped world) is sub-
sumed under the receptive realm of the arts. In this arrangement, the function
of artistic form is precisely that of enabling a transposition from the realm of
primary assessment to the realm of secondary creation. Translated into aes-
thetic categories, the idea that the aesthetic process is a secondary creation
means that, for the eye of the aesthetic subject, pure, intact material is an invis-
ible, non-existent realm. The aesthetic subject—in Bakhtin’s early terminol-
ogy, the author—“receives” the form as already accentuated by cognitive and
ethical experience, and only then sets into motion the mechanism of secondary
creation, which entails the act of reassessment, or, the axiological mapping of
the material world, into what ﬁnally takes the shape of a material object. It is
the subject’s validation that bridges the gap between the realm of primary, eth-
ical and cognitive experience, and the secondary realm of the aesthetic. The dy-
namic set of relations, which at once facilitate and crown the aesthetic process,
is the aesthetic object. 
In Lieu of Conclusion: Bakhtin’s Concept of Form and the Rise of Secular
Modernity in Late-Imperial and Early-Soviet Russia
There is a certain irony in the fact that Bakhtin’s redeﬁnition of the concept
of artistic form is performed by utilizing the aesthetics of Broder Christiansen,
insofar as practically the same theoretical repertoire fed the Russian Formalist
ideas on the autonomy of the aesthetic ﬁeld, so fervently denied by Bakhtin in
“The Methodological Questions of Literary Aesthetics.”
30
Although radically
opposed to the Formalist arguments for the autonomy of literary series,
Bakhtin formulates his critique by contemplating the mechanisms of artistic
isolation, which is, in a different critical register, used by the Formalists to de-
ﬁne the working of the crucial mechanism of estrangement. The elliptic note
found on the margins of the manuscript of Bakhtin’s “Author and Hero in Aes-
thetic Activity,” which simply reads “[s]econdary aesthetics, without isola-
tion” (“Vtorichnaia estetika, bez izoliatsii”) (SS 110), clariﬁes the small, but
vital difference between Bakhtin’s use of the category of aesthetic isolation
and the Formalists’ appropriation of the same theoretical scaffold, and, conse-
quently, between their respective approaches to the question of form. Bakhtin
believes that the artist’s input into the process of bestowing artistic form is
vital (a premise which is not denied by the Formalists), and that the difference
between an art-work endowed with form and content itself is essential for our
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30. Indeed, the ﬁrst chapter of Christiansen’s book is dedicated precisely to the question of
the autonomy of aesthetic value (“Die Autonomie der ästhetischen Werte”). 
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understanding of the aesthetic process (which is precisely the cornerstone of
the Formalist doctrine as well); but in Bakhtin’s interpretation, the form-
 endowed art-work incorporates the cognitive and moral “layers” of the content
without discarding them. Consequently, whereas for Bakhtin the aesthetic
process is the crowning achievement on the ediﬁce of human experience, for
the Formalists the aesthetic act means putting an end to the pre-aesthetic
realm, and the opening of an entirely autonomous domain. 
This difference brings into sharper focus the speciﬁc usability of turn-of-
the-century neo-Kantian theories and phenomenological theories of value in
the thought of the young Bakhtin. Hermann Cohen’s, Broder Christiansen’s
and Heinrich Rickert’s respective insights were used by Bakhtin as key lever-
ages to reposition the aesthetic realm vis-à-vis experiential reality, a move
that enabled him to critique the Formalist doctrine from a conceptual vantage
point. Inspired by Rickert, Bakhtin thus contends that the task of aesthetic ac-
tivity is to super-evaluate the world in an act that would assimilate, rather
than exclude, the rational and ethical identity of the world. To assert this all-
encompassing capacity of aesthetic activity Bakhtin, in turn, needed Hermann
Cohen’s intervention, which made the boundaries between the three Kantian
faculties more porous. With this framework, Bakhtin was then able to further
elevate the aesthetic function by ascribing to it an integrative and overarch-
ing position among human faculties. All of this allows Bakhtin to juxtapose
aesthetics, thus conceived, to the cognitive act, which “relates negatively to
the preceding realities of [the ethical] act and aesthetic seeing” (SS 285), and
asserts its speciﬁcity through negation. 
The function of form in this arrangement is nothing short of essential; it is:
to elevate the segments of the cognitively or ethically pre-ordered world onto
a plane of personal assessment, or, to subject the old order of experience to a
new, axiological unity asserted by the human (aesthetic) subject. Yet again, as
Bakhtin’s marginal remark in “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” sug-
gests, the purpose of an individual formative act is not to “isolate” and inval-
idate the subsumed cognitive and ethical realities, but rather to incorporate
them in a new, axiological form of unity. The function that is performed by
the form-giving act far exceeds the scope of aesthetic debates: the form-giv-
ing act means the re-appropriation of the world, which had been articulated
by acts of knowledge (science and philosophy) and morality (ethics). In other
words, art fulﬁlls its task of bringing together the worlds of mind and experi-
ence, nature and culture, individual and society, in a form-giving mental act.
This task, interestingly, is very similar to the one Bakhtin set before art at the
very outset of his philosophical path, in his programmatic 1919 article “Art
and Responsibility,” where he made an ardent plea for the unity of three
“realms of human culture—science, life and art” by/within the redeemed, in-
dividually responsible human subject (SS 5–6).
It should be noted at this point, though, that philosophical discussion of the
16 Slavic and East European Journal
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conditions of aesthetic activity and the form-giving act vis-à-vis the neo-
Kantian conceptions of two realities and three faculties dominates Bakhtin’s
account of form so convincingly that, paradoxically, it renders less relevant
his polemics with the theoretical conceptions of the Russian Formalists.
Moreover, the organicist pathos of Bakhtin’s inquiry raises the question of
whether, appearances notwithstanding, the real intention of his theory of form
was to launch a philosophical critique of the Formalist aesthetics at all, or
whether his discussion was aimed at something greater than that. Bakhtin’s
use of a neo-Kantian conceptual framework, his emphatic rejection of the
ideas that language can be detached from the entirety of human experience
and, ultimately, that literature may be methodologically independent (of sys-
tematic philosophy), in a way overshoot the purported target in order to cast
a categorically negative verdict on the processes of singularization and indi-
vidualization of the human sciences overall.
Indeed, Bakhtin’s critique of the methodological insufﬁciencies of Russian
Formalism, all of them caused by the alleged isolationism of their methodol-
ogy, has limited effect. This is so not just because Bakhtin’s critique was of-
tentimes unfair,
31
nor because the scholarly apparatus on which his arguments
stand fails to comply even with the academic standards of his own time (let
alone those of our time). His critique remains partial because it challenges the
philosophical validity of one literary pragmatics, rather than the only perti-
nent aspect of this literary pragmatics—its own aesthetic viability. The crux
of Bakhtin’s discussion is not to demonstrate that the mechanism of estrange-
ment is aesthetically ineffective, but to reveal this mechanism as inappropri-
ate from the point of view of what he terms systematic, or philosophical aes-
thetics. In other words, for Bakhtin the question is not whether an aesthetic
principle was aesthetically productive or not, but whether the question of aes-
thetic effectiveness was a relevant question at all. If Bakhtin’s 1924 essay on
artistic form is viewed in the context of his other early writings, most of
which are permeated with the integralist view of human experience, the idea
that the real target of Bakhtin’s criticism was somehow more general gains in
plausibility.
Profoundly inspired by the organicist vision of the human sciences and
human experience as an integral whole, Bakhtin radically opposed the idea of
the regionalization of the human sciences, the embodiment of which in the
late imperial and early Soviet intellectual scene he traced in the intellectual
practice of Russian Formalism. In the words of Max Weber, this diversifying
On “Secondary Aesthetics, Without Isolation” 17
31. Bakhtin’s theory of “overcoming of the material” has rightly been compared to that of
Eikhenbaum (Grübel, “Der Russische” 2242–2243). More strikingly perhaps, in his 1921 essay
“Rozanov,” Viktor Shklovsky makes it clear that “[a] literary work is pure form. It is neither
thing, nor material [...]” (189, emphasis added)—an argument that renders Bakhtin’s critique all
but ungrounded.
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and localizing was a corollary of the process of the socio-economic stratiﬁca-
tion of Western societies. The continuous “intellectualization” of human so-
ciety, Weber writes, brings about the “disenchantment” (Entzauberung) of the
world, and human knowledge in the age of disenchantment no longer seeks
to give answers to ultimate questions of “[w]hat shall we do and how shall we
live” (Readings 326),32 but turns “vocational” and dissociated into speciﬁc
disciplines. The birthplace of the idea of the autonomy of the cultural domain
lies precisely there, in the process of specialization of human knowledge, but,
Weber believed, both these processes which facilitated the sea change in the
epistemology of human sciences were crucially enabled by the advent of cap-
italism. Correspondingly, the earliest visible calls for the “disenchantment” of
the human sciences arrive on Russian soil in the late imperial years, in the era
of Russia’s only nascent, yet burgeoning, capitalism. The pledge for the au-
tonomy of the cultural ﬁeld, or, in the context relevant for our discussion, the
idea that literature and the arts are autotelic domains with inherent principles
of evaluation, should thus be seen as expressions par excellence of the gen-
eral process of societal modernization. Weber’s words from Sociology of Re-
ligion are a pertinent commentary on the sociocultural climate of the Russian
1910s: the artistic emphasis on external content characterizes “unreﬂectively
receptive” approaches to art, in contrast to which stands the pursuit of
uniquely aesthetic values, which is characteristic of “intellectualist civiliza-
tions” (243). While aesthetic autonomy and the disciplinary dissociation of
the humanities are reﬂected upon by Weber as unquestionable signs of socie-
tal modernization, Bakhtin in his early years uncompromisingly denounces
the compartmentalization of human sciences and rejects the idea of uniquely
aesthetic values as a contradiction in terms. The present article has charted the
tools Bakhtin used to profess his critique of modernity, a critique which we
may conclusively characterize as asynchronic. The socio-historical context of
his engagement with the rising tide of modernity, as well as the distinct coin-
cidences of thought outlined here, invite, indeed mandate, a more systematic
future exploration of the relation of Bakhtin’s early epistemology to the inti-
mations of Russian intellectual modernity of the 1910s and 1920s. 
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Тезисы
Душан Радунович
О «вторичной эстетике, без изоляции»: Философские корни бахтинской теории
формы 
Тема данной статьи—социальные и философские предпосылки ранней конце -
пции художественной формы Михаила Бахтина. Главным стремлением молодого
Бахтина было отвергнуть в методологическом смысле концепцию «формы как
материала», развиваемую его современниками—русскими формал истами.
Бахтинская критика формалистской эстетики формы, которая получает наиболее
развитое выражение в статье «К вопросам методологии эстетики словесного тво -
р чества» (1924), основана на предпосылках неокантианской фил о софии, прежде
всего, на эстетических концепциях Германна Когена и Бродера Христиансена. Из
репертуара немецкого неокантианства Бахтин также заи мствует свой ключевый
аргумент—что эстетическая деятельность является «вторичным творчеством». В
отличие от «первичных» актов познания и мора льного суждения, искусство
«пре дна ходит» упорядоченную действительность, которая уже оценена
познанием и этическим суждением. Таким образом, Бахтин утверждает, что
художественное творчество является скорее переоце нкой эмпирической дей -
ствительности, чем прямым вторжением в эмпири ческую действительность.
При таком подходе художественная форма является существенным признаком/
выражением вторичной, оценочной эстетической деятельности, фундаментально
несводимой к познавательно и этически неопре деляемому понятию материала.
Наиболее значимым моментом бахтинской те ории является понятие эстетичес -
кого объекта. Скорее психическое, чем мате риальное понятие, эстетический
объект является результатом формальной дея тел ьности по преимуществу; таким
образом, Бахтин считает именно эсте тический объект сверхзадачой эстетич -
еского анализа. Статью завершает оценка резкой критики Бахтиным концепции
эстетической автономии, развитой представителями русского формализма.
Автор статьи заключает что, в соотве тствии с традиционными взглядами неока -
нтиа нства на будущее гуманитарных наук, цель бахтинской критики идеи эсте -
тич еской автономии, так же как и его критики формалистской эстетики формы–
отрицание процесса модернизации и специализации научных дисциплин. 
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